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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-1418
___________
SONG HUI LIN; RU ZHANG,
Petitioners
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency Nos. A094-824-528, A094-824-529)
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Henry S. Dogin
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 23, 2010
Before: FUENTES, ROTH and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed:  March 16, 2010)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Petitioners Song Lin and Ru Zhang, a husband and wife from China’s Fujian
Province, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”), based on their fear that one or both of them will be forcibly
      The letter, addressed to Lin, was obtained by his father in China.1
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sterilized for violating China’s family planning policy if they are forced to return. 
Specifically, they alleged that they are at risk because they had three children while
residing in the United States.  The Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) determined that the petitioners failed to show that their fear of sterilization was
an objectively reasonable one and denied relief.  This petition for review followed.
I
In support of their application for relief, the petitioners submitted a large collection
of background materials on China’s family planning policies, including the 2005 State
Department Country Report on China’s human rights practices, news articles, reports by
international organizations, and documents produced by Chinese authorities detailing the
family planning policy and sanctions for its violation.  In addition, the petitioners
submitted a letter, purportedly from the Changle City, Yingqian Town, Huli Village
Committee, advising that because Lin is the father of three children, he would be a target
for sterilization if he returns to China, despite the fact that his children were all born in
the United States.   Further, the petitioners submitted three letters – one from Zhang’s1
mother and two from other female acquaintances – stating that the authors had violated
the family planning law by having more than one child and had been forced to undergo
sterilization.  The BIA denied relief, reasoning that under Matter of J-W-S-, 24 I&N Dec.
185 (BIA 2007), the petitioners failed to “present reliable, specific, and objective
3supporting evidence that they would be subjected to forced sterilization, imprisonment, or
any other punishment based upon the birth of their children in the United States.”  A.R. 3.
II
We have jurisdiction over the petition under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  Because the BIA
issued its own opinion, we review its decision rather than that of the IJ.  See Li v. Att’y
Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2005).  However, we also look to the decision of the IJ
to the extent that the BIA defers to or adopts the IJ’s reasoning.  See Chavarria v.
Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006).  We review agency factual determinations
for substantial evidence, and we will uphold a factual determination “unless the evidence
not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.”  Zhang v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d
150, 155 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 
A petitioner bears the burden of establishing “a well-founded fear of persecution,”
which can include forced sterilization.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B); Yu v. Att’y Gen., 513
F.3d 346, 348 (3d Cir. 2008).  To demonstrate eligibility for asylum based on a fear of
future persecution, an applicant must demonstrate, inter alia, “that a reasonable person in
[his] circumstances would fear persecution if returned to [his] native country.” 
Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 592 (3d Cir. 2003).  To satisfy the objective
prong, a petitioner must show that he would be individually singled out for persecution or
demonstrate a pattern or practice of persecution of similarly situated individuals.  Lie v.
Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d. Cir. 2005).  
4The petitioners raise two arguments in their petition for review that require
discussion.  First, they contend that the IJ improperly analogized their case to the alien in
Matter of J-W-S- without giving due consideration to the specific background evidence
they provided.  In Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2008), we vacated the
BIA’s decision because the Board relied exclusively on its decision in J-W-S-, without
giving any indication that it considered the evidence submitted by the alien.  Id. at 268-69. 
Here, in contrast, the BIA’s decision indicates that it did consider the evidence that the
petitioners submitted.  Indeed, the BIA stated that, “despite the testimony and extensive
documentary evidence in the record, the respondents have not demonstrated the objective
prong of a well-founded fear of future persecution.  They have failed to present reliable,
specific, and objective supporting evidence to establish that they would be subjected to
forced sterilization, imprisonment, or any other punishment based upon the birth of their
children in the United States.”  A.R. 3.  Moreover, as discussed below, both the IJ and
BIA provided substantial analyses of the Huli Village Committee letter, on which the
petitioners relied heavily in support of their claims for relief.  Accordingly, we disagree
with the petitioners’ contention that the BIA failed to sufficiently consider their
background evidence.
Next, the petitioners argue that the BIA failed to give due consideration to specific
supporting evidence they provided – specifically, the Huli Village Committee Letter and
the three letters from women who were sterilized.  As to the Huli Village letter, the IJ
      We note that the Board did not commit the error seen in Liu v. Ashcroft, 372 F.3d2
529, 533 (3d Cir. 2004), where it proceeded as if satisfying the requirements of 8 C.F.R
§ 287.6 was the only way to authenticate a document.  Here, the Board expressly
contemplated other means of authentication.
5
reasoned that the letter was not entitled to great weight because (i) it was inexplicably
conclusory and (ii) there was an insufficient showing that the letter was authentic or was
issued by an authentic organization.  The BIA agreed, noting that the document did not
comport with the authentication requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 287.6, and did not bear any
separate indicia of authenticity or reliability:  the document was not an original, and Lin’s
father did not submit an affidavit or other evidence to corroborate Lin’s testimony that he
asked his father to obtain information from the committee.  The BIA also noted that the
letter did not indicate that Lin would be forcibly sterilized upon returning to China. 
Given the unclear circumstances related to the letter’s procurement, it was reasonable for
the Agency to express doubts about its reliability.   As such, we are not compelled to2
disagree with the decision to afford the letter reduced evidentiary weight.
Nor do we find error in the lack of any express discussion in the Board’s decision
of the three letters recounting experiences of forced sterilization.  The BIA must consider
the evidence presented to it, but it need not expressly parse each piece of evidence
submitted.  See Zheng, 549 F.3d at 269-71.  As discussed above, we are not faced with a
situation where the Board ignored relevant evidence.  Rather, as the BIA noted, it
considered the voluminous evidence before it, but concluded that the petitioners had
6nevertheless failed to meet their burden of proof.  Although the experiences described in
the three letters warrant sympathy, they do not compel us to disagree with the Agency’s
decision.  Indeed, the letters describe sterilization procedures that were forced upon
women who, while living in China, violated the family planning laws.  However, those
accounts are not any more probative of the petitioners’ likelihood of facing such sanctions
than the other background material in evidence, as they do not bear on China’s policies as
they relate to returning parents whose children were all born outside China.  We therefore
conclude that the BIA’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.
We have reviewed the remaining arguments raised by the petitioners, and conclude
that they lack merit and do not warrant further discussion.  Further, because the
petitioners failed to demonstrate their eligibility for asylum, we also agree that they were
unable to meet the higher standards applicable to applications for withholding of removal
and CAT protection.  See Sioe Tjen Wong v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir.
2008) (withholding of removal); Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 212-13 (3d Cir.
2005) (CAT relief).
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.
